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Abstract 
Drawing on data from a series of informal conversations about public safety 
and police-community relations, we distinguish between a speaker’s 
generalized communicative intentions with respect to metaphor use and story-
telling, based on what Chafe (1994, p. 145) calls “unifying ideas that persist in 
semiactive consciousness” and the spontaneous intentions that arise within the 
short-term focus or spotlight of consciousness and guide the production of 
actual utterances.  Although speakers occasionally enter a conversation with a 
fixed intention to express an idea with a particular metaphor, tell a particular 
story in a particular style, or accomplish some other speech act such as 
persuading or informing, more commonly in ordinary conversations speakers 
begin with only a generalized intention to engage in the social interaction, 
sometimes but not always accompanied by generalized intentions regarding a 
particular topic or a particular form of expression. We argue that these 
“unifying ideas” interact with the contents of the short-term focus or spotlight 
of consciousness to generate spontaneous communicative intentions that in 
turn guide the production of metaphors, stories, and other language segments. 
Often these spontaneous communicative intentions arise interactively in 
response to other participants’ utterances; sometimes they arise in response to 
unforeseen opportunities in the speaker’s own utterances. Consequently, in 
ordinary casual conversations the spontaneous communicative intentions 
behind metaphor, story-telling and humor are often formed ‘on the fly,’ in 
response to the dynamic social interaction, and sometimes as a result of 
collaboration with other participants. 
 
Key words:  conversation, discourse, metaphor, humor, intentionality, story-
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telling. 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
Story-telling and metaphors are universal and common in conversation, often interwoven 
with each other. Previous work (Ritchie, 2010, 2011b, 2014) has shown how metaphors are 
often transformed into stories, stories are often transformed into metaphors, and frequently 
complete understanding of both metaphors and stories requires consideration of both the 
metaphorical and story elements of a text (Negrea-Busuioc & Ritchie, 2014). The question of 
intentionality in both metaphor use and story-telling has also received considerable attention 
recently, with some theorists arguing that it is not possible to determine from the text alone 
whether a particular metaphor was used deliberately (e.g., Gibbs, 2011). Others argue for a 
more nuanced view, in which the role of deliberate metaphor in communication may vary 
across texts and genres and the question of deliberateness is closely related to the linguistic 
form and conceptual structure of the metaphor (Semino, 2008; Steen, 2013). In Negrea-
Busuioc & Ritchie (2014) we show that, in at least some instances, complete comprehension 
of metaphors, including story metaphors, requires the assumption that they were used 
deliberately. In this essay we extend this analysis, addressing a different but also previously 
neglected question about intentionality: When does intentionality in metaphor use, story-
telling, humor, and other forms of figurative language use arise? In this essay we argue that 
intentions often arise spontaneously, and sometimes change, in response to opportunities that 
appear in the flow of discourse itself. 
   
1.1  Intentionality 
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Gibbs (1999) argues that an important part of how we understand language involves 
“recognition of speakers’ / writers’ intentions” (1999, p. 9). This can be a complex task; as 
Gibbs points out, people often have multiple communicative intentions for even a simple 
utterance. The task is even more complex in tropes such as irony (Gibbs, 2000) or teasing 
(Coates, 2007), where the communicative intentions may be deliberately ambiguous. It is 
often difficult for other participants in a conversation to be certain about a speaker’s 
communicative intention. All language (and more generally all signaling) is inherently 
ambiguous, and comprehension of communication always requires inference (Wilson & 
Sperber, 2004). Like non-participant researchers, interlocutors must often rely on inferences 
based on what they know about the context, including what has gone before in the 
conversation, other utterances by the same speaker, non-verbal cues, and so on.   
 Gibbs (1999) claims that people ordinarily distinguish between ‘intention’, which 
applies to persons, based on inferences about a speaker’s beliefs and desires, and 
‘intentional’, which applies to actions, based on inferences about intention as well as skill and 
awareness. It is useful to conceive of intentionality as varying from fully intended activities, 
which result from conscious deliberation, to activities that happen non-intentionally, by 
accident or as an unforeseen by-product of some other action. Gibbs argues that most 
activities, including communication, are best viewed as ‘half-intended’; “the words mostly 
pop into mind automatically without any conscious deliberation” (1999, p. 32). However, for 
our purposes we will refer to this phenomenon as ‘spontaneously intended.’  A better example 
of a half-intended phrase would be a double-entendre (“I have a hard time getting up in the 
morning”), where only one of two or more possible meanings was intended.   
 Chafe (1994) argues that conscious attention involves a narrowly focused activation 
of a small part of the experiencer’s world knowledge; each idea is active as a focus of 
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consciousness for a brief time, and ideas are refreshed or replaced every second or two.  The 
‘spotlight of focused conscious attention’ is a useful metaphor for this phenomenon.  
Referents, including participants, topics, and purposes that are more persistent and stable, 
Chafe calls ‘semi-active consciousness.’  In discourse, the discrete ideas in the focus of 
consciousness are expressed linguistically in brief spurts of language that Chafe calls 
‘intonation units’, typically about four words in length, which are organized into utterances.  
Ideas are linked within more inclusive ‘super-topics,’ which persist as unifying ideas in semi-
active consciousness over longer stretches of conversation.  A speaker aims at verbalizing the 
overall current focus of consciousness as a clause, but it is necessary to distribute more 
complex ideas across several intonation units within an utterance or sometimes several 
utterances spread across multiple speaking turns. According to Chafe, disfluencies — pauses, 
fillers, start-overs — demonstrate that consciousness contains more than language, and 
demonstrate the difficulties involved in talking.  It follows that disfluencies provide the 
analyst with clues as to a speaker’s intentionality.  As we speak, we listen to our own speech 
and compare it with what we intended to express; when the discrepancy is too large, we 
hesitate, correct, or start over.  Sometimes a speaker may change the intentionality to match 
what was spoken — especially when the actual utterance offers unforeseen opportunities.  
This is often apparent from the conversational context.  
 Combining Gibbs’s insight about the semi-intentional nature of word-production with 
Chafe’s concept of ‘focused conscious attention’ and Barsalou’s (2008) perceptual simulation 
theory of cognition (for a detailed discussion see also Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Ritchie, 
2009a, 2010), we get a picture of thought — Chafe’s super-topics in semi-active 
consciousness — as a dynamic background of weak simulations of perceptions and motor 
activities (partial activation of neural systems that would be engaged in actual perception or 
actual muscular action) representing current attention and generalized purposes. Simulations 
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are associated with language units, and as discrete ideas become active, associated words and 
clauses also become activated or, in Gibbs’s previously quoted phrase, “pop into mind 
automatically without any conscious deliberation.” During conversation the resulting 
language is monitored, often as it is spoken; mismatches between perceived effects and 
intended meaning result in disfluencies. Thus, what Gibbs describes as ‘half-intended’ 
utterances and we describe as ‘spontaneously-intended utterances’ can be construed as 
evidence for more complex underlying intentions, which are ordinarily not present as 
language until they are expressed (aloud, or in mentally rehearsed speech).   
 The question of intentionality poses some particularly interesting issues for analysis of 
playful (paratelic) communication as well as metaphor use and conversational story-telling.  
Metaphors are often introduced into a conversation by a single speaker, then repeated and 
transformed by subsequent speakers (Cameron, 2007).  Stories in conversations may have 
one teller or many, may be spread over several speaking turns, interspersed with other 
communicative acts (even with other stories), may involve actual events, imagined events, or 
a mixture of actual and imagined events. Given the potential for stories to ‘transport’ listeners 
into a ‘story-world’ that may be quite alien to the actual world they inhabit, stories have the 
potential to activate complex simulations and achieve cognitive effects in especially subtle 
ways (Brock et al., 2002; Green, 2004; Green & Brock, 2002), often outside interlocutors’ 
active consciousness.   
 Conversations often have a relaxed and playful character in service of social bonding, 
play (Apter, 1985), and what Dunbar (1996) calls ‘social grooming’, an extension of the 
physical grooming that is central to social interactions among chimpanzees and many other 
primates. People converse for the sheer pleasure of sociability, in which case competition is 
likely to be down-played or suppressed altogether (Norrick, 1993), in the interest of 
conviviality. In such a paratelic conversation group members are likely to be less demanding 
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of relevance and tellability and more tolerant of whimsy and language play (Everts, 2003; 
Ritchie, 2011a, 2011c; Ritchie & Dyhouse, 2008) such as whimsical metaphors and stories.  
 Gibbs (1999) distinguishes four distinct approaches to meaning.  In the encoding / 
decoding approach, meaning is an inherent property of utterances.  In the intentionalist 
approach, meaning is a property of the speaker’s intentions. In the perspective-taking 
approach, meaning is determined by how the hearer understands an utterance.  In the dialogic 
approach, meaning emerges from the participants’ joint activity (see also Clark, 1996). This 
study draws on a socio-interactional approach to communication, consistent with what Gibbs 
(1999) describes as the dialogic paradigm, which conceptualizes meaning as “doubly-
dynamic” (Haugh, 2008). In this sense, meaning is achieved in the interaction between 
speaker and hearer.  Individuals do not necessarily approach an interaction with prior 
intentions, and when they do these are likely to change and new intentions emerge in the 
process of the interaction. All participants in a conversation contribute to constructing the 
understanding of what is communicated, so that their cognitive processes are, often to a large 
extent, interdependent or dyadic rather than autonomous (Arundale, 2008). According to the 
interactional view, communication is often characterized by an emergent intentionality 
(Arundale, 2008; Clark, 1996; Gibbs, 1999; Haugh, 2008, 2009). Intentionality in 
conversation is fluid and co-constructed rather than the sum of pre-existing individual 
intentions and it is generated by interlocutors’ simultaneous engagement in “anticipatory and 
retroactive inferencing” (Haugh, 2009, p. 98) in the process of producing and grasping 
meaning.   
 In this essay, we examine a variety of metaphors, stories, and story-metaphors from 
natural conversations, using many of the same contextual cues interlocutors would use to 
draw inferences about speakers’ communicative intentions. Based on the evidence gleaned 
from these examples we argue that the intentions underlying instances of metaphor use and 
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story-telling may emerge from, and in response to, the immediate social-interactive context, 
and that initial intentions may shift in response to the fluid context of casual social 
interactions. We focus primarily on unstructured conversations among peers. We discuss 
several examples of collaborative story-telling, in which the apparent intention of a story 
emerges from the inventive collaboration of multiple participants. The instances of 
metaphors, story-telling, and metaphorical stories described in this paper illustrate several 
ways in which intentionality may be collaboratively developed in response to the changing 
conversational context, including unexpected opportunities and changes in the salience of 
various elements of common ground. 
    
1.2  Metaphors   
 
We understand ‘metaphor’ as any use of language in which the speaker / writer talks, writes, 
or thinks about something in terms of a different domain of experience. We followed a 
procedure for identifying metaphors adapted from the Pragglejaz Group (2007; see also 
Cameron, 2006; Semino, 2008): determine the meaning of an expression in context, and if the 
unit has a more basic contemporary meaning that can be distinguished from and understood 
in comparison with the meaning in context, identify the word or phrase as metaphorical. This 
approach does not speak to the question of whether the speaker intended the phrase or any 
particular listener heard the phrase as a metaphor, but extensive research supports the claim 
that people are influenced by metaphorical mappings regardless of whether they recognize 
the metaphor (Gibbs;  2006, 2009).  
 
1.3   Stories 
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Researchers define ‘story’ and ‘narrative’ more or less broadly, according to their purposes.  
Schank and Berman (2002) and Bruner (2002) give rather restrictive and highly structured 
definitions, but for this study we follow Abbott’s (2008, p. 13) simpler and more inclusive 
definition:  “the representation of an event or a series of events.” For this study, we define 
‘narrative,’ consistent with Bruner, as a more structured telling of a series of thematically and 
causally connected events that includes something that was at least potentially unforeseen.   
We define ‘story’ more broadly, as any “representation of an event or a series of events,” 
whether or not it satisfies Bruner’s criterion that “something unforeseen must happen.” (In 
retold stories, which appear often in conversation data, part of the meaning in the telling is 
anticipation of an outcome that is well-known by all or most of the participants.)   
 
 
2.  Method 
  
The examples discussed here are drawn from conversations among groups of four to six 
socially homogeneous people who knew each other at least informally prior to the 
conversation (Gamson, 1992; Sasson, 1995), as part of a broader study of how people think 
and talk about issues related to public safety and police-community relations (for detailed 
description of the conversations and participants see Ritchie, 2010, 2011a, 2011b). 
Participants were recruited by students in advanced seminars or by paid research assistants, 
who acted as facilitators, but intervened only when necessary to keep the conversation on 
topics relevant to the overall theme of police-community relations. Most of these 
conversations took the form of ordinary social gatherings, with participants who knew each 
other socially. Conversations were audio-recorded and transcribed for analysis, with names 
changed and all potentially identifying information removed, then metaphors and stories were 
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identified according to the above-cited definition.   
 It is not possible for a researcher to determine with any certainty the intentions of a 
speaker in using a metaphor or telling a story; by the same token, interlocutors also often 
have difficulty knowing what a speaker intended — and even speakers may not always be 
able to explain their intentions with certainty. Interlocutors must often rely on cues in the 
context, including what has preceded a particular utterance or story and how it is related to 
the speaker’s other contributions. These same resources are available to the researcher. 
Accordingly, each author independently examined the metaphors and stories for internal cues 
as to the speaker’s intention, then examined other evidence including what had gone 
immediately before, as well as other utterances by the same speaker, using this evidence to 
corroborate or qualify the initial interpretation. We then compared our interpretations and, 
where disagreements were apparent, re-examined the sample and the surrounding discourse 
together.  We recognize that our interpretations and attributions in each instance represent 
only one among many sets of possible interpretations:  in most cases, we believe similar 
issues of intentionality, the primary focus of our analysis, would still arise even with radically 
different interpretations.  
 
 
3.   Intentions for telling stories 
 
In every case, participants clearly had an intention to engage socially in the interaction.  
Beyond that, in most if not all cases, participants entered the conversations with prior 
attitudes and beliefs about the topic of police-community relations that function as what 
Chafe (1994, p. 145) calls “unifying ideas that persist in semiactive consciousness.” We argue 
that these “unifying ideas” interact with the contents of the short-term focus or spotlight of 
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consciousness to generate spontaneous communicative intentions that in turn guide the 
production of intonation units and their organization into utterances.  
  
3.1  Single-teller stories with stable intentions 
  
Although stories often seem to arise from complex and dynamic sets of intentions, sometimes 
they are produced with apparently clear and stable intentions. An example comes from a 
group composed of five middle-aged African-American men. George, who was highly critical 
of the Portland Police Bureau and its senior-level management throughout the conversation, 
told the following story with the obvious intention of supporting his view of the police which, 
based on other utterances in the conversation, was cynically critical. This story is an example 
of what Norrick (2000) calls ‘retold stories’; it is likely George had told it more than once 
prior to this telling.  It is a complete narrative under most definitions (see, e.g., Bruner, 2002; 
Schank & Berman, 2002):  it has characters, location, and a plot that begins with a problem or 
challenge, proceeds to an attempted resolution, followed by a reversal, final resolution, and a 
coda explaining the significance of the story.   
Tony Stevens was ex-Marine, Vietnam era.  He had a guy came in.  Robbed a gas 
station.  Tony grabbed the guy and held him down.  The police came in.  In spite of 
what everybody in the surrounding area was telling them, the police jumped on Tony, 
and choked him to death.  Why?  The perpetrator was white and Tony was black. And 
this was a detective that did it.  This was when Potter was chief of police. There are 
certain patterns that happen1.    (Ritchie, 2010) 
 
Although it is a complete narrative, the Tony Stevens story was produced in a lean, terse 
                                                 
1 We will use italics to highlight metaphorically-used segments of language relevant to the interpretation of 
speakers’ intentions in conversation. The transcriptions are simplified and do not mark intonation units.  
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style, with no embellishment and few details.  The fact that Tony had served as a marine in 
Viet Nam provides information about his character that both explains his heroic response in 
restraining the hold-up artist and underscores the situational irony of his being the one who 
was attacked and killed by the police officers. The fact that Tony was killed by a police 
detective anticipates and refutes the possible conjecture that inexperience or poor training 
might explain the police officers’ response; it also implicates police bureau leadership in the 
unjustified attack on Tony and thereby sustained George's criticism of the bureau. There is 
only one obvious metaphor, which appears as part of the coda:  “There are certain patterns 
that happen.”  The primary meaning of pattern, a spatial design, is here mapped onto a very 
particular story in a way that suggests predictability and repetition, converting the entire story 
into a metonym for community-police relations.  Happen would ordinarily be applied to a 
particular event; its use here blends with the metaphorical mapping of pattern to map a 
quality of active dynamism onto the implied repetition, so that every element of the story 
(Stevens’s innocence, the inaccurate assumptions made by the responding officers, and the 
deadly outcome) are mapped onto community-police interactions in general.   
 As was apparent from several utterances earlier in the conversation, George entered 
the conversation with an intention to make some broad points about ‘institutional racism’ and 
poor (ineffective and corrupt) leadership in the police bureau, and telling the Tony Stevens 
story served that communicative objective quite well. Given the nature of the story and of the 
audience, it is likely that the listeners knew the story as well as George did; although this 
would explain the sparse details, it leaves open the question of why the story was told at all, 
rather than merely being mentioned, as were other similar stories. By telling the story in this 
terse, unembellished way, George was able to raise its salience for the other participants, as 
well as for the two research assistants who facilitated the conversation, a young African-
American male and a European-American female (Ritchie, 2010). Given the evidence of this 
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overarching communicative intention, it also seems quite likely that George intended the 
metaphorical mapping of pattern onto the larger topic of police procedures and police-
community interactions — whether or not he consciously used the expression as metaphor.   
It is likely that George and the other participants were also aware, throughout the 
conversation, of the broader audience, the social scientists and, possibly, public officials to 
whom the results of the research project will eventually be reported. George may have had a 
different intention for each of these audiences (Ritchie & Cameron, in press). For the 
immediate audience, the other participants and the two graduate students, the apparent 
intention was to illustrate claims about the prevalence of police violence against African-
Americans and the complicity of police bureau leadership in this problem. With respect to the 
African-American student facilitator, the intention may also have fit within a general project 
of instructing younger members of the community about the continued seriousness of police 
racism as a problem faced by all the African-Americans. To the white female student 
facilitator, and the extended audience of researchers and readers of the research, the story and 
the metaphor are likely to draw attention to the injustices perpetrated by police officers 
against African-American members of the community and exemplified by the story. It is 
unlikely that many of these intentions were present as propositions in George’s mind, 
although the central intention of raising the salience of the story’s themes probably was.   
 A very different story, also apparently told with a stable intentionality, is drawn from a 
conversation among a group of middle-class white residents of an urban neighborhood of 
single-family homes. The group had been discussing the importance of casual street-centered 
socializing as a way of ensuring a safe environment for the children who live on the street, 
and the importance of children to the vitality of the neighborhood; Leanne had particularly 
emphasized this latter point in previous passages. Near the end of the conversation, she told 
the following story about a recent encounter with one of the children. 
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I was walking down the street.  She was sitting there she .. she jumps up and she said.. 
I said ‘How are you?’ she said ‘Today was the first day of first grade! and it was just 
wonderful!’  And she had on this .. this black leotard and white tights and little shoes 
and she said ‘and I’m going to be going to dance class now and afterwards my dad is 
going to take me to the park and it’s like the best day of my life!’  eh heh! and she was 
literally bouncing up.. and.. down.. I mean she could not stay still .. she was so 
excited … that was just… wonderful .. you know? it was just fantastic to be able to 
live on a street where you can see that every day.  (Ritchie, 2011a) 
 
Literally is a common example of a metaphorical ‘tuning device’ (Cameron & Deignan, 
2003) that calls attention to and intensifies the emotional excitement expressed by “bouncing 
up and down.” The entire story is presented as a metonymic example of pleasurable 
interactions which happen fairly frequently.  Every day can be analyzed as simple hyperbole 
but it blends with the story to create a metaphorical expression of satisfaction with the 
interactions of which this is offered as typical.   
 This story illustrated the kind of amicable inter-generational interaction that typifies 
the street life of the neighborhood, and also expressed the teller’s personal pleasure in this 
inter-generational interaction. Through this and other similar narratives, all related in tones of 
affection and amusement, Leanne probably also intended to indicate to Todd, the one parent 
in the group (and through Todd, to the other parents on the block), that she sees the presence 
of young children in the neighborhood as adding value, both because of the social 
relationships they crystallize and because of their contribution to the liveliness of the street.  
On the surface, this and other stories about life on the block appear to have been told to 
instantiate a sense of security and sociability, and to imply that sociability contributes to 
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security. But they also appear to be part of a sustained and deliberate strategy of building and 
maintaining the integration of the young families in the community, and securing the 
continued commitment of the four sets of parents, with Todd as a surrogate, to the 
neighborhood (Ritchie, 2011a).   
 Perhaps above all, Leanne's story about the first day of school provided entertainment 
and enjoyment to the others, and thus contributed to the convivial atmosphere and to the 
social solidarity of the group through shared enjoyment of this story. By evoking memories of 
other, similar stories, this story would also have served to remind the other participants of the 
everyday occurrence of similarly pleasant encounters. It is also apparent from the manner in 
which she told the story that Leanne enjoyed recalling and retelling the story for its own sake.  
Here, the presence of disfluencies suggests that only the overall outlines of the story were 
present as conscious attention and neither the specific details nor the metaphors were 
‘deliberately’ used; Leanne filled in descriptive details as the relevant simulations entered the 
moving spotlight of conscious awareness.  
 In contrast to Leanne’s story, there is no enjoyment attached to the Tony Stevens story 
— on the contrary, it is quite distressing. However, George’s story is likely to have enhanced 
social solidarity, in this case by emphasizing the participants' shared identity as members of 
the same community, and their shared sense of endangerment at the hands of what they 
regard as poorly trained, poorly disciplined, and possibly racist police officers. Thus, 
reinforcement of a certain view of salient aspects of community structure was at least 
implicitly part of the intention of both examples, whether or not they were present as fully-
formed ‘deliberate’ intentions.   
 In summary, these two stories, each told as a complete narrative by a single teller, but 
told in very different social and cultural contexts, both appear to have served a variety of 
implicit intentions. On the surface, both stories expressed factual information and thus had 
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the potential to bring about significant changes in the mutual cognitive environment — but it 
is likely that most or all of the interlocutors in both groups already knew the crucial facts. At 
most, these stories merely increased the salience of already known facts. However, it is likely 
that both stories, in the manner of their telling and by the very fact that the speaker chose to 
tell them, also accomplished important objectives with respect to group cohesion and 
reinforced its teller’s identity within the group. Thus, each of these stories appears to have 
accomplished several communicative intentions simultaneously, even if few or none of these 
objectives were consciously articulated in propositional form.  
 
3.2   Spontaneous shifting intentionality 
 
Although many of the stories in the public safety conversations were narrated in a way that 
accomplished one or more pre-determined intentions, many examples also occurred in which 
the intentionality of a story changed part-way through, as a result of action by either the 
narrator or another person.  In one example, from a group of left-leaning political activists, 
Jordan suggested an analogy which led to other comparisons of police officers with people 
who occupy various social roles.  Tyler then picked this up and converted it spontaneously to 
an acted-out story:  
  
Jordan: Police are like garbage men.  They deal with a lot of things we don’t want to 
deal with. That would be like drunk and disorderly parts of society. 
Tyler:  Yeah.  So do social workers, right?  And doctors.  I don’t want to cut someone 
open and look at their guts.. (pause)  Well, okay I might.  (general laughter) 
Fuck.  Now everyone knows I’m a serial killer. And not just the people in this 
room, but someone else I’m going to have to kill when they read this. This is 
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great. (Ritchie, 2010). 
 
Jordan’s garbage men metaphor served to illustrate and extend a previously introduced 
‘public servant’ view of the role of police in society and display a degree of sympathy for 
police officers by emphasizing some of the unpleasant aspects of police work; it may also 
have been intended to express a cynically disparaging image of police officers. Tyler's initial 
response may have been intended to limit the implied sympathy for policemen, or it may have 
been intended to soften the disparaging tone by extending the comparison to higher-status 
occupations.   
 Either way, Tyler’s elaboration of the ‘doctors’ schema presented an unanticipated 
opportunity to branch into a grotesquely entertaining story in which he portrayed the role of a 
serial killer, someone who might want to cut someone open and look at their guts. The pause 
following “cut someone open and look at their guts” is consistent with the inference that 
Tyler only realized the comic potential of this graphic description after he uttered it.  This 
metaphorical fantasy story, produced spontaneously as a jazz-like riff on the previous image, 
contributed to the light-hearted sociability and group solidarity by entertaining the others and 
sustained Tyler's social role and self-image as a jokester (Ritchie, 2010). The closing 
metaphor “this is great” is likely to have been intended, within the fantasy story, as a quoted 
ironic commentary, but may also have been intended as a commentary on the story, as a 
literal appraisal of the extended ‘servant’ metaphor and its applicability to the topic of the 
role of police officers. The sequence is one of several examples from this conversation in 
which participants disrupted the telic purpose of the conversation with a paratelic sequence, 
apparently spontaneously produced and usually rather grotesque.   
 Initial intentionality is also frequently altered when one speaker introduces a story or 
story theme with a particular intention and another speaker subsequently extends or 
references the same story, or another story on a similar theme, but toward a very different 
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end.  An example occurred in the group of Latino students mentioned earlier. Two initial 
stories were told by Manuela, in part to respond to the facilitator's question whether members 
of the group had had recent interactions with police officers.  In the first of these, she related 
that her family had been burgled several times, and on one of these occasions she lost a 
laptop computer, but the police never recovered anything. A few minutes later she told a 
longer and more detailed story:     
Manuela:  When I was living in the uh Northwest near umm Emanuel hospital umm, 
like it was like two summers ago actually umm… one time I was going to 
school in the morning and taking the streetcar and I was walking minding my 
own business and there was this umm.. this woman who was just.. crossed the 
street to where I was walking and she pepper-sprayed me and tried to steal my 
wallet.   
Eduardo:  What!?   
Pena:   Wow!   
Manuela:  Yeah and of course I freaked out. Um thankfully I got some help and the 
woman didn’t take my purse.  The hospital was just like the next block away, 
there was this man who helped me, who took me to the emergency room. I 
remember a cop came and later and asked me, how tall is she? What was her 
race? What she looked like?  And I gave him the details and um and I never 
heard anything, if they caught her, or if this had happened before in that area.  
Cuz I never really think because it was a nice neighborhood. Umm and heard 
never anything bad or people get assaulted or cars being broken in.  (Ritchie, 
2010) 
 
Although this story was apparently told partially in response to the request for examples of 
interactions with police officers, it also appears from the style of the narration that Manuela 
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was still upset about the incident:  Her story was produced spontaneously, apparently with the 
intention of inviting sympathy (which she received).  It also has the quality of a ‘good story,’ 
a contribution to the shared entertainment and conviviality.  Again, the disfluencies suggest 
that particular phrases emerged as the flow of simulations in the spotlight of focused 
consciousness activated associated language, and Manuela selected phrases that best fit the 
story-world she intended to create.  The overall intention to tell the story may have existed as 
a ‘super-topic’ in global consciousness, but the actual words, including the contrasting 
metaphors of normality and non-normality “popped into mind” as local intentions in response 
to the flow of perceptual simulations within the focused spotlight of consciousness.   
 Over twenty minutes later, these two stories were brought up again by Eduardo, in a 
light-hearted, joking way that allowed Manuela to down-play the emotional importance of the 
pepper-spray story and decrease the strength of its connection to her personal identity.  In a 
discussion of the difficulties faced by police officers, and some of the strategies they use to 
negotiate their social roles, Eduardo compared the experience of police officers to our own 
everyday experiences:   
Eduardo:     Just like us we have good days and bad days, right.  Like good days, good 
things happen some days, sometimes you are not getting your house broken 
into (laughs)    
Manuela:    Or assaulted (laughs) 
Eduardo:    Or assaulted (Both Eduardo and Manuela are laughing) with the hand 
Mace and stuff,  
Manuela:    Yeah 
Eduardo:    But like you know. But I bet you are pretty pissed for the rest of your day 
(general laughter) 
Manuela:   Yeah I was pissed (laughs) of course who wouldn’t be? (Ritchie, 2010) 
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Eduardo's reference to Manuela's story, and repetition of her metaphors, was directly relevant 
to the topic (police officers have bad days just like everyone else) and that was part of 
Eduardo's intention. It is most likely that the intention to refer to Manuela’s story emerged 
spontaneously from the opportunities afforded by the flow of conversation. In this case, it 
was another participant’s remark that seems to have stimulated Eduardo’s intention to 
compare police officers’ “good days and bad days” to Manuela’s particularly bad day.  
However, the subsequent exchange in which Manuela and Eduardo collaborated in changing 
the tone of the pepper spray story has no apparent relevance to the topic of police officers. It 
appears to have been intended primarily to help Manuela change her own feelings about the 
pepper spray incident by laughing about it. Again, this intention emerged spontaneously from 
the opportunities afforded by the flow of conversation, influenced by the overarching 
intention of offering emotional support to a friend. This second brief allusion to the story also 
afforded Manuela the opportunity to alter the implications for her social identity, by reversing 
the initial emotional valence of the story from one of victimhood to one of laughing at her 
misfortunes.  This potentiality may have been part of Eduardo's intention in bringing up the 
stories again; this possibility is supported by the repeated metaphors and other evidence of 
group solidarity and mutually supportive interactions throughout the conversation (Ritchie, 
2010).    
 
3.3   Reframing a story in a shifting conversational context 
 
In another group from the same series (Ritchie, 2010), several of the participants had attended 
a high school in a wealthy suburb of Portland.  The school has a reputation for extensive 
alcohol and drug use that is more or less tacitly accepted by parents, teachers, and even the 
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local police. The conversation included several stories that seemed to celebrate the ‘anything 
goes’ atmosphere in the school, including casual availability and use of illegal drugs. It also 
included several stories about police officers being called to local schools for various reasons; 
most of these focused on the ineffectual nature of the police presence. The tone throughout 
this conversation was a light-hearted braggadocio that is somewhat typical of young adults 
from upper-middle class backgrounds (as celebrated by a long series of movies in the ‘teen 
sex comedy’ genre).   
During one of the discussions of police officers being called into school, Elli began a 
story from her own high school years:  “like, for once, I was threatened, and assaulted, and 
the police had to come in for that, and they expelled the guy, but…” At this point, Fred 
interrupted with a story about a brief fight between two girls in the suburban high school and 
another story about a friend in Portland where “he gets in fights all the time, and he’s even 
been stabbed,” then tried to change the subject back to drugs. Elli ignored the attempted topic 
change and picked up her story: “But, to be honest about that, I was trying to provoke him 
into doing something like, so I could get him expelled.” (general laughter). Now Beth 
interrupted with the observation, “sounds like the violence might have been worse than when 
I was in school [.…] no one ever serious… seriously got hurt, there’s just, fisticuffs, but.. I 
always wanted to use that word, actually.” (general laughter). Beth probably intended the 
word fisticuffs as a way to minimize the level of violence and support her claim that the 
violence when she was in school was not serious, and only after she uttered the word realized 
how other participants might view it, as a ‘big word.’ Her self-teasing admission that “I 
always wanted to use that word” then arose as a spontaneous intention to acknowledge the 
incongruity and deflect any potential critical response. The disfluency supports the inference 
that she did not recognize the incongruent fit between the word and the social context until 
after she had uttered it. Beth’s self-tease also shifted the topic and tone of the conversation to 
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such a degree that Elli's story was no longer relevant, so Elli temporarily gave up her attempt 
to tell the story.   
 Beth’s interruption was followed by a return to the ‘drugs and alcohol’ topic, 
including two stories about students showing up drunk to class and school functions.  When 
the topic turned to a recent news story about an adolescent girl (in a different section of the 
U.S.) being strip-searched because she was suspected of possessing some prescription-
strength pain-killers, Elli, apparently giving up for the time on her own story, joined in.  She 
did not return to her earlier story until several minutes later, when the topic turned again to 
police intervention in schools, affording an opportunity to reframe the story as relevant to the 
topic of police intervention.   
Elli:  I think, it would also be good, if the outside.. whatever.. authorities, or what 
ever, also worked also with, sort of, not just that, but other crimes in the 
school, like the guy who assaulted me.  I’ll explain it. I’d been provoking him 
a lot because I didn’t want him near the school, and I thought that if I pushed 
him enough that he snapped, then I could get him expelled and I did, and he 
threw me against the locker and made some threats in front of a teacher and 
got expelled. But he didn’t get any other, um, outside punishment, it was just, 
“okay, you’re expelled.” 
Fred:  No assault charges? 
Elli:  No, no nothing.  Grabbed me by the arm and threw me against the locker.  
Turns out, if you bring up the fact that he got away with rape, he got really 
upset.  And also they didn’t really crack that.  He was accused of rape by 
another female student, and then she just dropped those charges and moved 
out of state really suddenly.  
 
“Grabbed me by the arm and threw me against the locker” is a very brief story within Elli’s 
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more extended story about her interaction with the male student, but it potentially activates a 
powerful action sequence, visual, and visceral simulations, strengthened by the violence 
implicit in her use of literal and metaphorical verbs, “assault,” “provoke,” “push,” “snap,” 
“expel,” and two repetitions of “threw me against the locker.” The next sentence introduced 
three background stories, a story of his (apparently habitually) getting upset and two stories 
nested within that story, his having allegedly raped someone and his having gotten away with 
it. She then elaborated these and connected them to another story that explained how he got 
away with the rape, in which passive verbs, dropped and moved contrast with the preceding 
active and violent verbs. All of this was nested within Elli’s story about wanting to get the 
student expelled and suggests a motivation for wanting to get him expelled, as well as a 
possible motivation for telling the entire story, but she did not elaborate.   
 Each time she resumed this story, Elli framed it differently and her apparent 
intermediate-level intentions in telling the story evolved to keep pace with changes in the 
conversational context. It is not evident why she persisted in telling this particular story. Her 
overarching intention may have been a desire to counteract the casual attitude toward illegal 
and anti-social behavior evident in several of the other stories, and she may also have wanted 
to demonstrate that even if the police do nothing, people still can be pro-active, they can react 
to what happens in their school. In this context, she may have also acted with the intention of 
establishing her own courage and cleverness in at least partially righting the wrong created by 
the lack of police action against the alleged rapist, and thus contributing to her social identity.   
In any event, once Elli had initially introduced the story, it was evidently highly 
salient to her, so that it came readily to mind whenever it seemed relevant to other topics.  
She may have had separate motives for telling the two parts of the story — her successful 
attempt to provoke a fellow student into assaulting her in front of a teacher and thereby 
getting him expelled from school has the quality of a ‘good story,’ which connects with 
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common knowledge about high school politics. The underlying story about the student 
getting away with rape also connects with a different set of common knowledge, and 
connects with several other themes in the conversation, in particular a set of underlying moral 
themes. The frequent interruptions and topic-changes by other participants might have been 
reasonably taken as evidence of a lack of interest, discomfort with the topic of rape in that 
upper middle-class school, or outright rejection of the topic, or may be evidence that different 
elements of her story activated their own stories and fueled their competition for the floor.   
 
3.4   Intentionality in collaborative story-telling 
 
Several of the conversations in the public safety series included examples of collaborative 
story-telling, in which several or sometimes all members of the group co-narrated a story 
known to all. In several of these, the intentionality itself seems to have evolved as the story 
progressed. One example occurred in the Latino Group cited previously, when the 
participants turned their attention to the central importance of family in disciplining children 
(Ritchie, 2010). In a discussion of problems people have with the police enforcement, 
Eduardo brought up a group-relevant stereotype, “They are called ‘brown people’,” and 
everyone laughed.  Brown people potentially activated not merely visual simulations of skin 
color but also a complex set of emotional simulations associated with schemas of ethnic 
stereotyping and bigotry: this is an example of how intentional in-group joking about 
otherwise objectionable stereotypes can be used to increase the salience of group identity, and 
thus both promote and exhibit group solidarity.  The apparent increased salience of their 
shared ethnic identity led immediately to a conversation about family discipline.  
 
Manuela:     Or just people in your family that do things that they are not supposed to 
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do.  (general laughter) 
Pena:   And even, even if they don’t do it they end up having trouble. 
Manuela:     No, not me – my brother.  (general laughter) 
Pena:   Even..  even if they sometimes don’t do anything they still get in trouble  
Manuela:  That is true.  (Ritchie, 2010) 
 
To this point, the conversation was ambiguous as to whether the reference was to 
parents or police — it is possible that participants intended and understood ’trouble’ in a 
general way, to include encounters with both police and parents. Manuela’s comment, “not 
me – my brother” may have been intended literally, as a clarification of who in her family 
typically misbehaved, but the laughter suggests that it was understood by the others in terms 
of a familiar childhood blame-shifting script.  Pena’s comment, “even if they sometimes 
don’t do anything they still get in trouble” may also have been intended and understood as a 
double reference, to Latinos generally and to children like Manuela’s brother in particular.  
 
Eduardo:    And sometimes like the harshest like punishment is usually by your 
family.  I don’t know if you guys.. (Pena laughs) ‘the look,’ (Eduardo laughs) I 
remember like sometimes that could be enough..  (general laughter) 
 
Eduardo’s comment that “harshest punishment is usually by your family” activated an 
element of the participants’ shared ethnic identity, a pride in the stereotypical strong family-
orientation of Latin culture, based in part on strict parental discipline. It also appears that the 
participants take pride in the strictness of their parents — the humor was affectionate and 
activated both an identification with their own families and with each other, an identification 
based on childhood experiences they are able to share, part of their common ground.  
Carmen, the Latina facilitator, then introduced another element, also part of their common 
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ground, their parents’ habit of using their full names as a way of indicating they were in 
trouble and demanding immediate attention.   
Carmen:     When your whole names get writ.. called out (laughs) 
Eduardo:    (Laughs) Oh yeah, you get the whole name  
Carmen:     First name, middle name, and then two last names (general laughter) 
Pena:          Actually I have three names (laughs)  
Adriana:   Oh wow 
Eduardo:    My parents were good with it. My parents were like first name the last 
name and you know. With parents were first name, middle name, last name 
and then the belt right afterwards (special effects) (general laughter)  
Manuela:     The belt.  
Pena:   or the shoe. 
Manuela:     the shoe. 
Eduardo:    I was too quick for those (general laughter) 
Manuela:     Its alright, I could take it. The chanclas2.  
Eduardo:    Catch it and throw it back. Give me some running time. That’s funny we 
were policed kids and now we are policed adults.  (Ritchie, 2010) 
 
In this exchange, each participant contributed metonymic references to personal stories, 
probably associated with memories of specific incidents, to constructing a generic story that 
readily connected with all of their individual particular stories. The entire exchange rendered 
parental discipline as simultaneously comically incongruous and a matter of personal (and, 
probably, ethnic) identity and pride.  The belt and the shoe are metonymic references to 
corporal punishment; Manuela specifically connected this with their ethnic heritage by 
                                                 
2  Sandals.  This seems even more significant because it was the only time Spanish was used in the 
conversation.     
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switching to Spanish, “the chanclas.” Eduardo strengthened the comic element with his mini-
story of attempting to evade parental discipline: “Catch it and throw it back.  Give me some 
running time.” Reminiscing about childhood, and about the strictness of parents’ or teachers’ 
discipline, is frequently used to enhance group solidarity, and similar exchanges occurred in 
many of the conversations in this series (Ritchie, 2010).   
 
3.5   Collaborative transformation of intentionality: Pissing in your soup   
 
A second and even more complex example of shifting intentionality during collaborative 
story-telling occurred in the New Left Group. As in several other groups, the participants in 
this discussion had returned several times to the topic of whether police are held adequately 
to account for mistakes and violations of police procedure, especially when their mistakes 
lead to injury or death of innocent bystanders, “and you see the police getting let off.” Tyler 
brought up the ‘servant’ metaphor that had appeared several times earlier in the conversation, 
including the passage discussed in an earlier section: “cops are more like a servant, like a 
waiter or waitress, right?  So if they fuck up, they say, oh, I’m really sorry. You want to talk 
to my boss or manager?” Deke pointed out a major difference: “ if you’re a cop and you 
screw up at work, like you pepper spray a baby, or you shot someone who didn’t deserve…. it 
is just weird.  Stakes are a lot higher than they are in our jobs.” Tyler first joked about then 
denied the importance of the difference: “I’m sure. If a waitress approached you with saying, 
oh I’m really sorry, you said over medium, but I got you over easy. Cops just fucking pepper 
sprayed your baby, even more so, right?  (general laughter)….  They feel a sense of  it’s a 
tough job, but fuck, you know, we all some of us have tough jobs. You should be held 
accountable at all levels.”   
 Here, the blend of humorous incongruity with the intense perceptual simulations 
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activated by the story of a baby being doused with pepper spray connects with and fills out 
the ‘high stakes’ schema (based on a familiar gambling metaphor) and furnishes a strong 
emotional backing for the concluding claim, the implication that, if waitresses are held 
accountable for mixing up a breakfast order, police officers should certainly be held 
accountable for causing pain and suffering to innocent civilians (metonymically, your baby).  
It’s a tough job is another idiomatic metaphor, often used, as it is here, as a way of 
anticipating and undermining or negating counter-arguments based on the difficulties faced 
by police officers.   
 Referring to a predictable response to the contrast Tyler had just described, Jordan 
commented that police officers must “feel our hate every moment of the day, right?” Tyler 
responded, “I think they feel a sense of that.. they feel the world has turned against them and 
to go beyond that is to change your practices. If you’re a waitress and you’re not getting good 
tips and you think people hate you, then you should quit pissing in their soup.” Thus far, the 
initial intention, to use a humorously incongruous comparison of police officers to a waitress 
in a diner has remained constant.  However, each contribution appears to have emerged 
spontaneously from the interaction of the overarching intention of the ‘police as waitress’ 
metaphor with the immediately preceding utterance. The metaphorical waitress story was 
evidently introduced with the intention of making the important points that police officers are 
fundamentally no different from other workers and should be held accountable and the 
parallel intention of telling a humorously incongruous story that would continue the 
pleasurable tone of levity and playfulness (Ritchie, 2010).  Quit pissing in their soup 
introduced an element of incongruous vulgarity, but this is consistent with, and builds on, the 
tone of playfully irreverent exaggeration introduced by “pepper spray your baby.”   
 With quit pissing in their soup, Tyler introduced a novel metaphor, extending the 
previous waitress instantiation of the ‘public servant’ metaphor in a humorously incongruous 
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way, that reinforced the previous story about a waitress apologizing for mixing up a breakfast 
order.  The intention was clearly to attach both the disgusting elements of the metaphor and 
the incongruity to the police officer schema, still entirely consistent with the initial intention, 
but the incongruity was too strong, and Celeste apparently could not resist the opportunity to 
exploit the comic potential:   
 
Michael:  Of course, the fallacy of that assumption …. 
  the waitress is doing something blatantly crazy unethical..  
Celeste:  Some places you get tipped more for that. 
Michael:  Like, I love that sauce.  (general laughter) 
Tyler:   You guys have the best soup. (general laughter) 
Celeste:  We do. 
Deke:   Think about that next time you order from the Waypost.  
 
This is only one of many instances in which one or more participants undermined the serious 
intention of another person’s story or metaphor for humorous effect.  At one level, this can be 
viewed as uncooperative, hostile, or even subversive, but at another level, by re-instating the 
play frame, here Celeste preserved the conversation as a primarily ‘sociable,’ hence never 
fully serious, interaction. The readiness with which the other participants joined in the fun 
and completed the re-direction of the story's initial intention from serious and critical to 
comic and playfully vulgar confirms that they did not interpret Celeste’s re-direction of the 
underlying intentionality as either uncooperative or hostile, and the implicit vulgar 
subversiveness of the remark fit well with the group’s apparent overall shared intentions 
(Ritchie, 2010). This type of collaborative intentionality is only possible in a situation of 
social harmony and cultural compatibility among participants; evidence of that level of 
compatibility is found throughout the conversation (see also Ritchie, 2009b).   
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3.6   Summary  
 
The examples discussed in the foregoing were chosen to represent a variety of different story-
telling episodes in a range of different contexts.  All involve some use of metaphor; several of 
the stories appear to have been used as metaphors. Some of the stories appear to have 
emerged from prior and somewhat fixed intentions: both George’s story about Tony Stevens 
and the manner in which he told it reflect a well-defined set of prior intentions and probably a 
well-rehearsed sequence of linguistic units.  Leanne’s story about the neighbor’s first day of 
school and Manuela’s purse-snatching story also reflect prior intentions, although they were 
probably less clearly defined than George’s and do not appear to have been rehearsed at all. 
Rather, it appears that each utterance emerged spontaneously as the simulations associated 
with the reconstructed event appeared in the focused spotlight of her consciousness.  At the 
other extreme, the acted out ‘serial killer’ story and the collaboratively-produced ‘pissing in 
the soup’ story appear to have emerged entirely in response to unforeseen opportunities in the 
discourse itself.   
 The stories about childhood punishments (the chanclas) and about police 
accountability (“pissing in the soup”) represent an interesting form of collaboration. Both 
apparently arose spontaneously in response to unforeseen opportunities and developed 
through the accumulating responses of participants’ to the previous participants’ 
contributions. These examples differ, however, in an interesting way. The chanclas story is an 
elaboration of a shared cultural script (itself expressive of shared cultural values), so that each 
person’s contribution was related to previous contributions in regular if not exactly 
predictable ways, based on the shared cultural stories and values. Pissing in the soup is an 
elaboration of a fantasy, itself couched within an outlandish fictional and metaphorical story 
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expressing police-related issues in terms of the values and practices of a corner café. The 
contributions are less predictable and arguably more creative, although they also are firmly 
anchored in shared cultural scripts and values.  
 
 
4.   Discussion.   
 
It seems obvious that participants in talk ordinarily have intentions for every contribution to a 
conversation, including the metaphors they use and the stories they tell — if they didn't, 
conversations would be incoherent and incomprehensible. However, it does not follow that 
participants necessarily begin a story, much less an entire conversation, with fully-developed 
intentions, that their intentions are necessarily telic or goal-oriented in any larger sense, or 
that they consistently pursue the intentions they begin with.  All of this happens sometimes.  
But on other occasions, speakers’ intentions develop and change, in response to the unfolding 
interaction, sometimes quite radically. As the preceding examples show, speakers’ intentions 
often change in response to others’ reactions or remarks, sometimes in response to 
unanticipated opportunities, including meanings or entailments in the speaker’s own 
utterance that were not initially noticed or attended to. Often, speakers’ metaphor use and 
story-telling intentions may emerge spontaneously in response to opportunities for word-play 
or teasing, as is evident in the New Left group discussed above, or simply as a desire to share 
a pleasant memory, as in Leanne’s story about the neighbor girl’s first day of school. These 
spontaneously-emergent intentions often do not develop beyond the overarching goal of 
maintaining sociability through shared pleasure, but sometimes listeners’ responses develop 
into full-blown dialogue that leads in directions not anticipated by any of the participants.   
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 Interlocutors enter a conversation with at least a generalized intention to interact 
socially, although the quality of that intention may of course vary (e.g., it may be hostile or 
friendly, telic or paratelic). Beyond that, interlocutors may or may not bring with them more 
particular intentions, for example to ask a favor, express an opinion, or relay information.  
Particular intentions of this sort may also arise, during the course of a conversation, in 
response to something that is said. For example, the mention of some topic may activate an 
intention to express an opinion on the topic, a metaphor introduced by another participant 
may present unanticipated expressive opportunities or stimulate memory of creation of an 
interesting story, or a story told by another participant in the conversation may activate a 
chain of associations leading to an intention to tell a different story. Thus, at least in casual 
social conversations even the overarching intentions associated with what Chafe (1994) has 
called ‘super-topics’ or ‘unifying ideas’ may remain stable only over relatively short stretches 
of conversation, sometimes enduring for only a handful of speaking turns. We argue that 
these more or less stable ‘unifying ideas’ interact with the contents of the short-term focus or 
spotlight of consciousness to generate spontaneous communicative intentions that in turn 
guide the production of utterances.    
 We propose that, at least in casual and unscripted social interactions, intentionality 
can most usefully be described as a continuum, ranging from the overarching and often rather 
generalized intentions associated with the initial purpose of the conversation (to be sociable, 
perhaps also to ask a favor, impart some information, or issue an invitation) to the 
spontaneous and more particular intentions that arise in response to the briefly activated units 
of awareness in the spotlight of focused consciousness, and activate the production of a story, 
a short utterance, or a metaphor or bit of word-play. The briefly activated units of awareness 
may stem from the utterances of other interlocutors, from unforeseen possibilities of one’s 
own utterances, from other bits of awareness from current sensory experience or memory — 
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or, probably most commonly, from the interaction of several of these elements. In general, 
spontaneous intentions are more specific and more active, overarching intentions less so.    
 In sum, aside from rehearsed stories like George’s story about Tony Stevens, most 
utterances in casual conversations are the product of spontaneous communicative intentions. 
These spontaneous communicative intentions emerge from the interaction of overarching 
intentions with simulations and language units in the flow of discourse. Overarching 
intentions may themselves be more or less stable, either present from the beginning in pursuit 
of a pre-conceived purpose, or emerging spontaneously from the speaker’s response to 
elements in the ongoing stream of discourse. Intermediate-level intentions often result from 
the dynamic interaction between cognitive and social-interactive (discursive) processes, and 
may reasonably be characterized as a property of the interacting social group taken as a 
complex, dynamic cognitive unit (see Ritchie, 2009b for a more detailed discussion). 
Collaborative intentionality and the collaborative story-telling it produces is only an extreme 
form of this socially interactive cognition.   
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